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Abstract: Immigration has unquestionably gained importance in Italian public opinion over the past few years; 
but what has been its effect on politics? Building on a recent trend in literature, this paper appraises the effect of 
immigration on the success of far-right parties. We analyze the results of the elections from 2001, when immigration 
was still marginal, to the last elections held in 2018. Applying time-series-cross-section methods to an original dataset, 
we find that immigration has had a consistent effect on votes for the far-right. Interestingly, we also show that economic 
factors likely weigh more on far-right votes than immigration.
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1  Is Europe’s right wing turn due to immigration? Empirical evidence from 
Italy
Over the last few years, immigration has gained significant relevance in the European Union. Political instability 
in North Africa (with the Arab Spring) and in the Middle-East (with the ongoing war in Syria), along with enduring 
economic disparities between North and South, have spurred large numbers of people on the roads towards the Old 
Continent. The repeated tragedies in the Mediterranean, the lack of a collective response to the phenomenon on the 
part of EU member states and the xenophobic reactions in many of the destination countries have contributed to 
putting the “issue” of migration at the forefront of political concerns (Ortensi et al. 2017; Van Wolleghem 2018). The 
various elections throughout the EU in 2017 and 2018 have shown that a good deal of the political competition was 
played out on migration-related issues, with far-right parties scoring very well, even in countries which traditionally 
feature a certain openness to diversity (Ortensi et al. 2017). Nonetheless, how much of the success of far-right parties is 
actually due to immigration remains a thorny question; a question which this paper proposes to address. Considering 
Italy as a case study, it seeks to appraise the effect of immigration – understood as the actual settlement of third country 
nationals in Italian territory – on people’s preference for far-right parties.
Whereas the study on the determinants of people’s attitudes towards foreigners are plentiful (see inter alia 
Dustmann and Preston 2001; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Card, Dustmann and Preston 2012), only recently 
has the focus turned to the effect of immigration on far-right parties’ electoral outcomes (Dustmann, Vsiljeva and Piil 
Damm 2016; Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2017; Becker and Fetzer 2016; Davis and Deole 2017). Most of these studies 
regard countries with a long-standing migration history. Conversely, little attention has been paid to countries that have 
become destination countries more recently. Yet, it is in these countries that the effect of sudden demographic changes 
is likely to produce the most dramatic political changes (Barone et al. 2016). Likewise, it is also in these countries 
that the effect is likely to be better appraised as the number of citizens with an immigration background1 is likely 
smaller than in old destination countries. Building on the growing body of evidence on the topic, this paper proposes 
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to investigate the impact of migration on election outcomes. More precisely, we look at the effect of the settlement of 
foreigners in Italian regions on the success of far right parties over the last 18 years, thus including the elections of 
March 2018, in which the far-right fared particularly well (see Pritoni and Vignati 2018, for an overview of the results). 
We find that immigration has a significant effect on the success of far right parties over the period considered, thus 
confirming the findings already advanced in literature. Such an effect, however, proves somehow less relevant when 
compared to the effect of unemployment. Empirical evidence is drawn from the application of time-series cross-section 
methods to an original dataset compiled for the purpose of this study. Different model specifications are tested to 
ensure the robustness of our results. 
Acknowledging the specificities of Italy’s recent history, the first section is dedicated to setting the boundaries of 
what we will call far-right, underlining the differences between the latter term and that of Fascism and Populism. The 
second section reviews the recent strand in international literature which aims at appraising the effect of migration 
on the vote for far-right parties. In so doing, we refine our research question and the scope of this paper. The third 
section defines our empirical strategy and explains our preference for random effects models over fixed effects and 
Instrumental Variables (IV). We also provide details on our data and estimation technique. The fourth section then 
presents and discusses our results. Finally, we conclude in the fifth section. 
2  The contours of the Italian far-right: unpacking the “center-right”
As a result of Italy’s recent history and political scene over the last sixty years, delineating the contours of the country’s 
far-right is a delicate undertaking. Even the term “right” is subtly avoided by its representatives, for that it resonates 
with Fascism in public perceptions (Ignazi 2005). Conservative parties thus self-locate themselves at the center-right of 
the spectrum whilst only the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano), which claimed a direct lineage with the fascist regime, 
affirmed its right-wing positioning (Ignazi 1998; 2005; 2018). Analytically speaking though, the self-proclaimed center-
right may (and should) be unpacked; and the parties that makes it up may be distributed on a larger array of the 
political spectrum. 
Whilst terms like Fascism, far-right or else Populism are often used interchangeably in common parlance, and even 
though they may overlap in reality, they remain different concepts that ought to be disentangled for the purpose of this 
article. Firstly, not all far-right parties share the fascist ideology insofar as they do not all rely on the palingenetic myth 
of national rebirth through revolution (Griffin 1994; Hainsworth 2008). Instead, they provide answers to those demands 
and needs generated by post-industrial and individualistic societies, responding to the identity crisis produced by their 
atomization (Ignazi 2003). As Ignazi (2003, 2) puts it, these “are no longer neo-fascist parties (...) they are perceived as 
right-extremist because they unquestionably occupy the right-most position of the political spectrum”. Secondly, not 
all populist parties are located at the far-right of the political spectrum, for Populism is more a communication and/
or discursive style than a consistent ideology or programmatic set of ideas (Rydgren 2005; see Gidron and Bonikowski 
2013, for an interesting literature review on the topic). 
So what is exactly the far-right? This question has mobilized a significant amount of scholarly attention without, 
however, producing a unanimous definition (Mudde 1995; Eatwell 2004; Hainsworth 2008), despite consensus has 
been found on the fact that there exists indeed such a family of parties located at the far-right of the spectrum (Camus 
and Lebourg 2017). The academic production has thus led to the generation of multiple definitions over the years, 
which, in some instances, differ to significant extents (see inter alia Mudde 1996; Druwe and Mantino 1996; Ignazi 2003; 
Hainsworth 2008; Griffin, Loh and Umland 2014). An interesting, and empirically useful, approach is proposed by 
Ivaldi (2004), which consists in defining the core characteristics of this heterogeneous family of parties. He defines four 
such characteristics: i) an anti-immigration and xenophobic stance; ii) an authoritarian discourse centered on security 
and strength of the state; iii) an economic program which combines elements of neo-liberalism with protectionist and 
social claims; and iv) anti-establishment discourse and focus on the public’s demands. As Hainsworth (2008) holds, 
the anti-immigration characteristic appears to be the most important, to the point that some analysts prefer the term 
“anti-immigration parties” to that of far-right. 
Applying these criteria to the Italian case may prove challenging. Whereas there is little doubt that AN (Alleanza 
Nazionale – National Alliance) or CasaPound may be regarded as far-right political formations, the case of the Lega 
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(Nord – Formerly known as the Northern League, now simply Lega, the League) requires some further considerations. 
Born as a regional party in 1991, it may have appeared as somewhat “moderate” at the outset (Passarelli 2013, 55), when 
mostly concerned with a transformation of the state along federal lines (Ignazi 2005). However, from the early 2000s 
onwards, it has decidedly turned to the right. As the opening line of a book recently written by Passarelli and Tuorto 
reads: “The (Northern) League is a far-right party”2 (Passarelli and Tuorto 2018, 9). Corroborating is the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey (CHES, 2002-2017) -- a pan-European expert survey on political parties and their positioning --, which 
places the then Northern League close to the AN at the right-most position of the political spectrum.3
In order to classify Italian parties according to their position on the left-right spectrum, we consider CHES data from 
2002 to 2017. Parties featuring an average score greater than 7.5 are considered as far-right parties. Those parties are AN, 
Lega Nord and Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), with respective average scores of 7.71, 8.42 and 8.13. Other parties – 
smaller formations – after careful analysis of their political platform over the last 18 years. These are: Fiamma Tricolore 
(Tricolor Flame), Forza Nuova (New Force), Fronte Nazionale (National Front), Lega d’Azione Meridionale (Southern 
Action League), Die Freiheitlichen (The Freedomites), Alternativa Sociale Mussolini (Social Alternative Mussolini), Destra 
Nazionale (National Right-wing), Rifondazione Missina Italiana (Italian Mussolinian Refoundation), Progetto Nazionale 
(National Project), Italia agli Italiani (Italy to Italians) and Grande Nord (Great North). Despite the high number of 
parties that, over the past 18 years, may be assimilated to the far-right, most of them are very small formations, often 
representing less than one percent of the total number of votes attributable to the far-right (and thus even less if we 
consider the total of votes expressed). As a matter of fact, AN, Northern League and Brothers of Italy represent together 
the largest shares of votes to far-right parties. Figure 1 and 2 display the distribution of votes between parties within the 
group of far-right parties delineated above, respectively for the Lower Chamber and the Senate.
Figure 3 then depicts the scores totaled by far-right parties in the Italian regions for elections for the two chambers, 
from 2001 to 2018.
Figure 1: Distribution of votes between parties within the far-right (%) and total score for the far-right (%) for the Lower Chamber, 2001-2018.
Nota: smallest parties are represented but their label is not displayed.
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Figure 2: Distribution of votes between parties within the far-right (%) and total score for the far-right (%) for the Senate, 2001-2018.  
Nota: smallest parties are represented but their label is not displayed.
Figure 3: Vote for the far-right in Italian elections for the two Chambers, 2001-2018 (% and standard deviation). Source: authors’ elaboration 
on Italian Interior Ministry data. The name of the regions is signalled with the first two letters of their name, except for Campania for which 
the two letters are CM.
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3  Immigration and vote for the far-right
Whereas the study of the determinants of people’s attitudes towards foreigners are plentiful (see inter alia Dustmann 
and Preston 2001; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Card, Dustmann and Preston 2012), only recently has 
the focus turned to the effect of immigration on far-right parties’ electoral outcomes. The wealth of this recent strand 
in literature lies in the different approaches employed and applied to different contexts. Mendez and Cutillas (2014) 
look into the effect of immigration on Spanish national elections over the years 1996-2011. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) 
estimate the effect of immigration on voting outcomes in the districts of the city of Hamburg, Germany, for national and 
federal elections in the 1987-2000 period. Harmon (2018) analyses the impact of immigration on votes for the far-right in 
Denmark. Similarly, Dustmann, Vsiljeva and Piil Damm (2016) study the effect of the refugees’ random allocation policy 
in Denmark and its effect on the vote for far-right parties in parliamentary and municipal elections over the period 1989-
1998. Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller (2017) appraise the relationship between immigration trends and vote for the FPÖ 
in the Austrian elections held in 1983, 1994, 2002 and 2013. Becker and Fetzer (2016) analyse the effect of immigration 
on the success of the UKIP party. Finally, Barone et al. (2016) investigate the effect of immigration on Italy’s center-right 
coalition in the national elections of 2001, 2006 and 2008. 
Interestingly, most these studies have shown a positive effect, more or less sizeable, of immigration on (far) right 
voting (see Davis and Deole 2017; a notable exception is Steinmayr 2016, who finds a negative association). Whilst 
they concur in producing a coherent body of evidence, the variety that characterizes them renders the cumulativeness 
of findings difficult. Most studies were conducted in different countries and consider elections at different levels of 
government. Likewise, empirical strategies differ significantly. Many have opted for instrumental variables (IV) based 
on foreigners’ self-sorting to proxy their geographical distribution (Mendez and Cutillas 2014; Barone et al. 2016; Halla, 
Wagner and Zweimüller 2017). Harmon (2018) too opted for an IV, although he used the availability of living space as 
a predictor of immigrant settlement. Others have used fixed effects models and focused on the share of foreigners in 
a given location (Otto and Steinhardt 2014; Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2017;4  Davis and Deole 2017) or have taken 
advantage of particular contingent features to implement quasi-experimental research designs (Dustmann, Vsiljeva 
and Piil Damm 2016; Becker and Fetzer 2016). 
Most these studies were conducted in countries with a long-standing immigration background and in which many 
former migrants have acquired citizenship and, thus, the right to vote in the elections. This is problematic if one wishes 
to truly assess the effect of immigration on election outcomes (Otto and Steinhardt 2014). More recent destination 
countries have only recently seen their demographic composition change. Consequently, the effect of the phenomenon 
is likely to be greater and thus better analyzed, empirically speaking. Italy is a case in point. An emigration country, it 
has only recently (and rapidly) turned into a destination country; this virtually offers the possibility to assess the impact 
of the passage from very-little to quite-some level of foreign presence (an argument also proposed in Barone et al. 2016). 
Whereas the percentage of foreigners in 1998 barely amounted to 1.7 per cent of the total population, it nowadays 
accounts for 8.5 per cent of the population, a share close to that observed in France and Germany. The acceleration of 
the phenomenon and the recent success of the far-right in Italy thus begs the question: how much is the latter due to 
the former?
4  Empirical strategy, estimation technique and data
To answer our research question, we propose to assess the effect of the share of foreigners in each of the Italian regions 
on the share of ballots that goes to far-right parties out of the total of the votes cast in an election year. Opting for such an 
approach presents the interest of facilitating its replication in other EU countries, with similar data, thus contributing 
to increase the comparability of results. We also compare elections for the lower and higher chambers as they feature 
different electorates and different stakes. Whereas the electorate for the lower chamber comprises all nationals above 
18 years old, voters must be 25 or more to vote at Senate elections. 
With respect to the method used, this study builds on previous research but opts for a different strategy. First 
of all, our study differs from that of Barone et al. (2016) on the Italian case in that we seek to estimate the effect of 
immigration on far-right parties rather than on the center-right coalition, presumably less concerned altogether with 
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immigration. Symmetrically, voters more concerned with immigration issues are also more likely to lean towards the 
far-right rather than vote for the conservative party. Another difference, we propose to investigate the relationship over 
a longer timeframe (2001-2018) so as to render our estimates more robust. Note that the period under scrutiny starts in 
times in which foreign presence in the country was limited, thus reinforcing the validity of our results.5 The downside 
of this strategy is that data at province level is scarce and we must therefore reason at region level. From another 
standpoint, our preferred estimation approach is that of random effects. Indeed, Instrumental Variables (IV) provide 
valuable insight and considerably reduce the risk of endogeneity posed by cross-section data; however, it is often hard 
to find a valid IV, able to effectively unveil causal mechanisms.6 Random (and fixed) effects techniques, on the other 
hand, can prove particularly useful if used with sound data and if the results are submitted to rigorous robustness tests.7 
Unlike a number of studies in this field, instead of a fixed-effects approach, we prefer the use of random effects 
and a model specification that accounts for both within- and between-cluster effects; i.e. a model that estimates 
the effects of variables within the regions but also between them (see Bartels 2009). Because fixed-effects models 
compute a coefficient for each cluster (here the regions), they absorb the variation between them so that the effect of 
time-invariant variables (or variables with little change over time) cannot be consistently estimated or meaningfully 
interpreted, despite their potential substantive importance. Differently, random intercept models allow the estimation 
of between-clusters effects with, however, the downside of confounding the within- and between-clusters effects. In 
other words, random effects models assume that the effect within clusters is equal to the effect between clusters, which 
is oftentimes not the case. Another, unlikely to be true, assumption underlying the use of random effects is that of 
the absence of covariance between clusters and covariates. Bartels (2009) proposes a random intercept approach that 
accounts for both the above assumptions. Accordingly, we propose to specify a model based on random effects whilst 
duly accounting for the difference between within- and between-cluster effects. Note though that we provide different 
specifications to test the robustness of the results obtained. Our starting equation is therefore:
Figure 4: Vote for the far-right for the two Chambers and share of foreigners in the Italian regions, 2001-2018 (%). Source: authors’ elabora-
tion on Italian Interior Ministry and Istat data
90    Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem, Nicola Pasini
yit = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼i0 + β1IMMIGit + β2Xit + ui0 + eit  (1) 
yit = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼i0 + β1IMMIGwit + β2Xwit + γ1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼���������i + γ 2𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋�i + ui0 + eit  (2) 
Where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼���������i  and 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋�i  are the cluster-specific means of our covariates and IMMIGwit  and Xwit  
represent the effect within clusters as being respectively IMMIGwit =  IMMIGit  - 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼���������i  and 
Xwit = Xit - 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋�i. 
Regarding the risk of endogeneity mentioned above, it is considerably decreased by the 
nature of the data at hand which repeats observations over time. In order to further reduce the 
risk of reverse causality, we also account for the existence of a vote for the far right before 
migration became a relevant phenomenon in Italy8 through the addition of a lagged dependent 
variable. Regarding the estimation technique, we use maximum likelihood as is custom for 
time-series cross-section analyses.  
The data is collected from different sources. Data on election outcomes is taken from 
the Italian Ministry of the Interior’s archive.9 In order to calculate the share of votes for the far-
right, all the lists and/or parties that received ballots from 2001 to 2018 have been carefully 
categorized and pooled together.10 The data regarding foreigners’ settlement is drawn from 
municipalities’ official registers. Because these register people moving in and, less consistently, 
people moving out, the share of migrants within regions is likely overestimated. We consider 
that using such data is still more suitable than resorting to IV as it accounts for a trend in 
(1)
Where i represents the regions, t measurement occasions, y our dependent variable, and IMMIG the percentage of 
foreigners on total population in region i, year t. X is a vector of the other covariates inserted in the model, u0i  accounts 
for unobserved heterogeneity across clusters, either with fixed or random intercepts, and eit is the level-1 error term. Our 
main coefficient of interest is therefore β1. Following Bartels (2009), we propose a refined specification which accounts 
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Xwit = Xit - 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋�i. 
Regarding the risk of endogeneity mentioned above, it is considerably decreased by the 
nature of the data at hand which repeats observations over time. In order to further reduce the 
risk of reverse causality, we also account for the existence of a vote for the far right before 
migration became a relevant phenomenon in Italy8 through the addition of a lagged dependent 
variable. Regarding the estimation technique, we use maximum likelihood as is custom for 
time-series cross-section analyses.  
The data is collected from different sources. Data on election outcomes is taken from 
the Italian Ministry of the Interior’s archive.9 In order to calculate the share of votes for the far-
right, all the lists and/or parties that received ballots from 2001 to 2018 have been carefully 
categorized and pooled together.10 The data regarding foreigners’ settlement is drawn from 
municipalities’ official registers. Because these register people moving in and, less consistently, 
people moving out, the share of migrants within regions is likely overestimated. We consider 
that using such data is still more suitable than resorting to IV as it accounts for a trend in 
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Regarding the risk of endogeneity mentioned above, it is considerably decreased by the nature of the data at hand 
wh ch repeats observations over time. In order to further reduce the risk of reverse causality, we also account for the 
existence of a vote for the far right before migration became a relevant phenomenon in Italy8 through the addition of 
a lagged dependent variable. Regarding the estima ion technique, we use maximum likelihood as is custom for time-
series cross-section analyses. 
The data is ollected from different sources. Data o  el ction u c mes is t ken from the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior’s archive.9 In order to calculate the share of votes for th  far-right, all the lists and/or parties at received ballots 
from 2001 to 2018 have been c refully categorized a d pooled ogether.10 The data reg rdin  foreigners’ settlement is 
drawn from municipalities’ official registers. Because these register people moving in and, less consistently, people 
moving out, the share f migrant  within regions is likely overestimated. We consider that using such data is still more 
suitable than resorting to IV as it accounts for a trend in foreigner settlement that is confirmed by occasional census 
data.11 In addition to t at, the data r gister the mov ment f foreign rs in a given municipality at a giv n time, which is 
likely to affect behaviors. Beside our main variables of interest, we also control for alternative explanations such as the 
economic and unempl yment trends, d mographic changes and region size12. We also provide estimates of time fixed 
effects to control the effect of external shocks, notably the bsorpt on of AN nto Berlusconi’s party and th  scandal over 
the misuse of Lega Nord’s funds by ex-party leader Umberto Bossi (Passarelli and Tuorto 2018). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable N. obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% vote for the far right 200 11.32 9.07 0.00 38.46
% foreigners 200 5.22 3.20 0.60 12.04
Chamber 200 0.50 0.50 0 (Senate) 1 (Camera)
% unemployment 200 9.42 5.22 2.70 24.10
Total population 200 2955009 2378456 119273 10036258
Population density 200 179.65 108.09 36.58 426.22
Turnout 199 78.23 6.23 62.76 89.56
Lagged DV 199 10.48 8.83 0.00 41.28
Years 200 Elections in 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018
Regions 200 Election in all 20 Italian regions
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5  Empirical analysis 
5.1  Results
Table 2 below reports the results of a series of regressions following equation (1). The first model (M1) is a random 
intercept model; the second one (M2) is a random intercept model, too, but it includes time fixed effects. The third and 
fourth models are cluster fixed effects models, with (M3) and without time fixed effects (M4). Time effects are included 
in M2 and M4 to test the robustness of our variable of interest to external shocks: i) in 2008, the political party Alleanza 
Table 2: Vote for far right (%) parties in Italy, 2001-2018.
  RE  (M1) RE & time effects (M2) FE  (M3) FE & time effects (M4)
% foreigners 1.425 *** 1.104 *** 0.912 ** 1.445 ***
(0.256) (0.268) (0.463) (0.506)
Chamber dummy 2.651 ** 1.409 * 3.374 *** 2.150 ***
( 1.192) (0.754) (1.121) (0.714)
% unemployment 0.490 ** -0.101 1.000 *** -0.006
(0.250) (0.166) (0.289) (0.287)
Total population 2.33e-07 2.88e-07 0.000 0.000
(5.63e-07) (3.47e-07) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.000 0.001 -0.358 -0.282
(0.012) (0.007) (0.394) (0.241)
Turnout 0.351 ** -0.107 0.514 ** 0.093
(0.172) (0.160) (0.200) (0.196)
Lagged DV 0.047 0.270 *** -0.079 0.140 **
(0.085) (0.062) (0.086) (0.063)
Year dummy 2006 8.270 *** 6.006 ***
(1.256) (1.754)
Year dummy 2008 -6.214 *** -7.032 ***
(1.388) (2.211)
Year dummy 2013 -5.098 ** -7.472 ***
(2.100) (2.434)
Year dummy 2018 9.262 *** 6.819 **
(2.517) (2.880)
Region fixed effects omitted omitted
Constant -30.700 * 9.073 -36.692 5.991
(15.809) (13.726) (29.090) (22.300)
Nb obs. 199 199 Nb obs. 199 199
Nb groups 20 20 Nb groups 20 20
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
LR test vs. linear 0.089 0.107 LR test Eu=0 1.000 1.000
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Std. errors in parenthesis.
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Nazionale was to merge with Forza Italia (then Berlusconi’s party) into the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà), 
thus considerably affecting our dependent variable; ii) in 2013, the leader of Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, was accused of 
misuse of public funds, a scandal that has weighted on the party’s success in the 2013 national elections (see Passarelli 
and Tuorto 2018, for more). In addition to that, time effects also account for the economic downturn which ensued the 
Global Economic Crisis. Model 1 is our preferred specification and will be used below for a refined analysis following 
equation (2).13
The results of the regressions show an effect of the foreign population on the percentage of ballots for the far right 
that is consistent across models and statistically significant, despite some changes in the coefficient’s magnitude (table 
2). On average, a one percentage point (p.p.) increase of foreigners on the total regional population translates into a 
1.2 p.p. increase in the percent of votes that goes to far right parties (with the estimates ranging from 0.9 to 1.4 across 
models). For our preferred model (M1), an increase of 1 p.p. in the foreign population corresponds to an increase in 1.4 
p.p. of the dependent variable. 
Note that the chamber14 for which the ballot is cast matters a great deal: elections for the lower chamber count an 
average of 2.4 p.p. more for far right parties than votes at the Senate. The effect of unemployment, too, appears to be a 
relevant factor of the vote for the far right, as it is statistically significant in M1 and M3. It is not statistically significant 
in M2 and M4 due to model specification: its effects, consistent across regions, are absorbed by year fixed effects. 
Interestingly, voter turnout15 proves to be significant, both statistically and substantively, so that, all things being equal, 
the more people go to vote, the more the percentage of votes for the far right increase.
We propose to further investigate the effect of migration onto votes for the far right by breaking down its effect at 
regional level and within the regions themselves (see equation (2) for more detail). Table 3 reports the results of the 
regressions. Considering the effect of foreigners, it appears to be mostly a within-cluster effect for that most of the effect 
estimated in M1 occurs within the regions and is statistically significant (this is corroborated by M3 and M4). Conversely, 
the between-region effect is of little magnitude and is not statistically significant, meaning that, on average16, there is 
no significant, region-specific, effect on the outcome. This strongly supports our hypothesis of a direct association 
between increase of foreign population and increase of the share of votes taken by far right parties. Interestingly, by 
disentangling the effects of unemployment between and within regions, there appears to be a strong correlation between 
unemployment and vote for the far right. The coefficient of the difference between within- and between-cluster effects 
(-2.012; fourth column on the right-hand side) is significant, indicating some level of cluster confounding between the 
two coefficients and suggesting the necessity to estimate them separately. The between-region effect compares average 
regional unemployment rates and their association with the dependent variable so that there appears to be an effect 
of overall unemployment levels in a given region. The sign of the coefficient is an interesting result: it suggests that 
regions with lesser average unemployment rates -- typically northern regions -- tend to vote more for the far right than 
regions characterized by more overall unemployment -- typically southern regions --, this in spite of the overall levels 
of foreign presence (since the coefficient, 0.324, is of little magnitude and is not statistically significant). Turning to the 
within coefficient, it shows that variation of unemployment in time affects far right parties’ success: as unemployment 
Table 3: Vote for far right (%) parties in Italy, Between and Within effects, 2001-2018.
  (M1) Within region Between region Diff. With.-Btw.
  Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
% foreigners 1.425 *** 0.859 * 0.324 -860
Chamber dummy 2.651 ** 3.457 *** - -
% unemployment 0.490 ** 0.985 *** -0.999 *** -2.012 ***
Total population 2.33e-07   0.000 7.74e-07 * 0.000
Population density 0.000   -0.368 0.006 0.383
Turnout 0.351 ** 0.497 ** -0.512 -0.985 **
Lagged DV 0.047   -0.084 - -
Constant -30.700 * 54.096 * - -
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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increases over time, so does votes for the far right. The magnitude of the coefficient of within-region unemployment is 
somewhat higher than that of the percentage of foreigners17, thus suggesting a greater effect on votes for the far right. 
5.2  Discussion
The results presented above confirm those reached elsewhere and reported in specialized literature (see literature 
review above). They thus enrich and develop a larger corpus of findings. However, such a confirmation must not 
preclude prudence in interpreting the results. Despite all the precautions taken and the inclusion of a lagged variable 
that accounts for a period of time in which there was little immigration and there was vote for the far right, there still 
exists a risk of reverse causality; i.e. the risk that vote for the far right affects the distribution of immigrants in Italian 
territory (see Bracco et al. 2017, for an interesting example). In our study, and taking into account previous research, 
we conclude to the absence of reverse causality; if there were, our coefficient for the percentage of foreigners would 
most likely have turned negative, as suggested by Bracco et al.’s findings (2017). In addition, we have tested out 
various specifications, be it in terms of modelling or in terms of controls. None of our tests has drastically changed 
our results. 
A last caveat is in order. Our analysis considers regions instead of smaller constituencies such as towns or provinces. 
Yet, investigating smaller constituencies would make a lot of sense as there are disparities within regions and between 
towns when it comes to the share of foreigners. That said, regions offer a good geographical and political reality to 
study the phenomenon. As bigger entities, focusing our analysis on regions reduces the risks of “voting with one’s feet” 
-- so to speak --; that is, for migrants or natives to move from one town to another if vote for the far right increases for 
the former (Bracco et al. 2017) or if immigration increases for the latter (Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2017). Likewise, 
considering regions also increases the quality of administrative data for the presence of migrants for the same reason. 
In addition, data scarcity at local level is a major issue when it comes to considering such a long time span. Reasoning 
at regional level ensures we use adequate data to test our hypotheses. 
6  Conclusion
Whilst a great deal of specialized scholarship has looked into people’s attitudes towards immigration, a recent trend in 
literature seeks to investigate the effect of immigration on election outcomes. Most studies, though, have concentrated 
on old destination countries, with the risk of having their estimates biased by a population of voters already diverse and, 
presumably, more opened to the phenomenon. This paper aims at contributing to this developing literature by adding 
the case of a country less accustomed to immigration: Italy. For long an emigration country, Italy has only recently, 
and rapidly, become a destination country. The sudden change in the composition of its population, but not so much 
of its electorate, likely brings political changes about. Accordingly, this paper investigates the relationship between 
immigration and vote for the far right in Italy. We focus our analysis on the Italian national elections for the Camera 
and the Senate that took place during the years 2001-2018, a period in which immigration passed from a marginal 
phenomenon to being one of the main subjects of concerns for Italian citizens (Ortensi et al. 2017). Our analysis is based 
on the collection and assemblage of administrative data at regional level. We resort to time-series cross-section methods 
to appraise the effect of immigration on votes for the far right over time. Different model specifications underpin the 
existence of an effect of the increase in the share of migrants in Italian regions on the share of ballots cast for far right 
parties (between 0.9 and 1.4 percentage point with every percentage point increase in the share of foreigners). We find 
that such effect is consistent across regions. At the same time, we find that the economic situation plays a significant 
role, yet not exactly that expected. Our results show that regions with generally higher unemployment rates are less 
prone to vote for far right parties. That said, increasing unemployment rates over the years within regions consistently 
translates into greater shares of votes for the far right. Our estimates reveal an almost symmetrical effect, with about 
one percentage point increase for every one percentage point increase in unemployment. With all due precautions 
taken, such an effect may be deemed higher than that of immigration, thus confirming and contrasting other studies 
conducted in European and North American countries.
94    Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem, Nicola Pasini
Notes
1. In this instance, we mostly refer to the foreigners who acquired citizenship; a good example is that of Otto and 
Steinhardt (2014). In their study on the electoral outcomes in the city of Hamburg (see below) they limit the 
analysis to the years prior to the reform of the German citizenship, after which the rules to acquire citizenship were 
considerably relaxed. 
2. In original language: “La Lega (Nord) è un partito di estrema destra.”
3. Whilst the AN scores 7.79 on a zero (left) to ten (right) scale in the CHES 2002 edition, the Northern League scores 
7.71 whilst Forza Italia, Berlusconi’s conservative party scores 6.93.
4. Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller (2017) actually use both IV and migrants’ share in population. They conclude that 
the two approaches yield similar inferences.
5. For the same reason, we include a lagged dependent variable; see below for more information.
6. Interesting IV have been proposed in the specalised literature. Mendez and Cutillas (2014) as well as Barone et al. 
(2016) propose to model migrants’ spatial distribution starting from networks of co-ethnics which settled in a given 
year (t0). Whilst this may be an effective strategy, the baseline year has to be taken before the period of analysis 
(Barone et al. and Mendez and Cutillas consider 1991) and present major shortcomings: it overlooks the increasing 
diversity of countries of origin over time so that the data collected in (t0) often does not reflect the range of countries 
of origin in subsequent years, thus generating biased estimates. For instance, in Barone et al., they consider the 15 
most represented nationalities, which account for “around 50% of total immigration” (p. 5).
7. Instrumental Variables have added value in cases in which the risk of endogeneity is high; i.e. the predictors are 
correlated to both the dependent variable and the error term, thus rendering coefficients inconsistent. This is 
especially the case with cross-section data. In the present study, which consider the regions as units of analysis 
with repeated observations over time, we consider that random effects estimation is a more suitable strategy. See 
below for more detail. 
8. For that, we consider the results of the elections in 1996, right after the profound restructuring of the Italian political 
scene which ensued the “Mani Pulite” tide, and before migration became topical.
9. Available here: https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/ .
10. Data relating to the 1996 elections were also retrieved to build the lagged dependent variable.
11. Notably, the 2011 census displays an inflection of the number of foreigners compared to municipal registers. Such 
an inflexion is more important in Lombardy and Lazio but does not affect the trend much. Data is accessible at 
http://demo.istat.it/ .
12. The economic situation is controlled for with the added-value per capita in a given region as well as with the 
unemployment rate in the same region. Given the high correlation between the one and the other, they are not 
inserted in the same model. The results displayed in Table 2 do not show the results for added-value per capita; 
which is only statistically significant in M4. Demographic change and region size are captured by the number of 
residents in the regions in election years. Data on added-value, unemployment and demography are Istat data, 
available here: http://dati.istat.it/ . 
13. We concentrate on M1 for further analysis in that it is more parsimonious and better fits the data. The analysis of 
the residuals display a rather homoscedastic distribution.
14. Elections for the Senate are coded zero and elections for the Camera are coded one.
15. Turnout was calculated considering the total number of votes cast divided by the total number of voters. It does not 
consider blank or invalid votes, as is custom. Note that blank and invalid ballots are not correlated with turnout 
(correlation coefficient about 0.04).
16. There are twenty regions in Italy and individual region fixed effects may be significant, outlining tendencies to 
vote more or less to the far right in a given context. But altogether, the effect of the share of foreigners between the 
regions is irrelevant if we consider the coefficient in question. 
17. Note that both variables are percentages so that their coefficients can be compared to some extent. That said, bear 
in mind that their range is quite different, with unemployment going from 2.7 to 24.1 percent, and foreign presence 
from 0.6 to 12 percent.
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